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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to analyse cooperation in R&D in the automobile industry in Spain. It 
first examines to what extent firms cooperate with external actors in the field of 
technological innovation, and if so, with what type of cooperation partner, paying 
special attention to the differentiation according to the size of the firms. Second, it aims 
to study how the firm’s size may affect not only the decision of cooperating but also 
with which type of partner, while controlling for other determinants that have been 
considered in the literature as main drivers of collaborative activities in R&D. We use 
data provided by the Technological Innovation Panel in the 2006-2008 period for firms 
in the automotive sector. We estimate a bivariate probit model that takes into account 
the two types of cooperation mostly present in the automotive industry, vertical and 
institutional, explicitly considering the interdependencies that may arise in the 
simultaneous choice of both. 
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1.          INTRODUCTION 
A firm may increase its technological capabilities either through internal efforts in R&D or 
though external activities such as hiring or cooperating in technological agreements. Firms 
seek to blend external sources of innovation with company-level competences and assets to 
incorporate new ideas (Chesbrough, 2003, 2006), allowing firms to gain greater 
technological innovation (Ili et al., 2010). In particular, R&D cooperation is a strategy of 
knowledge sharing and diffusion across firms that has increased importantly in recent 
decades. R&D cooperation allows knowledge to flow among different firms to create value 
and increase their competitive advantage (Frels et al, 2003). Indeed, the most common 
explanation for the formation of inter-organizational ties is that interdependence and 
resource complementarities matter for the firm’s economic and innovative performance 
(Owen-Smith Powell, 2006). But cooperation partners can be of different types (customers, 
suppliers, competitors, firms in the group, universities and research institutes) and it is the 
case that firms collaborate with different types of partners at a time, as they bring in 
different sets of knowledge or complementary capabilities (Belderbos et al, 2004). 
 
Cooperation agreements are particularly important in the automobile industry. The 
diffusion of lean production has implied that original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) 
move away from vertical integration so that suppliers assume more design tasks 
(MacDuffie and Helper, 2007). A car is a technologically complex system where various 
process and product technologies converge (Lara et al., 2005). In many instances, 
manufacturers and their suppliers lack the set of technological capabilities, resources and 
knowledge necessary to perform individually technological changes to be incorporated into 
the modules, systems and components of the cars in order to satisfy their clients, who are 
increasingly demanding more innovations in the new models without increasing the price. 
In addition, innovations are costly and must be recovered in less time. This is probably 
why, in recent years, the innovation strategies of the firms are characterised by an 
increasing importance attached to external sources of knowledge, thus establishing 
cooperation agreements in the field of R&D with external agents (Martínez and Pérez, 
2003; Oliver Wyman, 2008). 
Many automakers firms located in Spain do not perform R&D activities or they do it 
sparsely. There are exceptions, such as SEAT, the only OEM in Spain capable of designing 
and creating their own models (with around 1,000 people engaged in R&D in its Technical 
Center), followed by Nissan MI and the subsidiary of Fiat (Iveco Pegaso), and to a lesser 
extent Renault (R&D in motors) and Santana Motor1. The other assembly factories in Spain 
only develop process innovations, receiving product innovations from other technical 
centers in the group.2 In the automobile industry, multinationals do not tend to make 
research in Spain but development in order to adapt their products to the local condition of 
the market (Berger, 2011). 
 
Given the importance of R&D in the automotive sector and given than most of it is made 
by foreign capital in the Spanish case, in this paper we want to analyse to what extent firms 
in this sector follow cooperative strategies in their R&D activities in order to overcome the 
limitations they may encounter when performing R&D activities by themselves. We first 
examine to what extent firms cooperate with external actors in the field of technological 
innovation, and if so, with what type of cooperation partner, paying special attention to the 
role that the size of the firms may be playing. Second, we aim to study the factors that turn 
out to have a determining effect on the decision of firms to carry out such collaborative 
activities in R&D. Specifically, we study how the firm’s size may affect not only the 
decision of cooperating but also with which type of partner, while controlling for other 
determinants that have been considered in the literature as main drivers of collaborative 
activities in R&D. We use data provided by the Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC) in 
the 2006-2008 period for firms in the automotive industry. We estimate a bivariate probit 
model that takes into account the two types of cooperation mostly used in such an industry, 
vertical and institutional, explicitly considering the interdependencies that may arise in the 
simultaneous choice of both. 
  
                                                 
1 Until its closure as a firm in 2011, Santana Motor coordinated the Hercules project between 2006-2008, together with 4 
other firms and 2 technological centres, to design a SUV hydrogen fuel cell. 
2 In Spain, most first-tier suppliers are of foreign capital and the R&D incorporated in their products tend to be developed 
out of Spain. Only few subsidiaries make product design and carry out part of its R&D in Spain (Lear, TRW, Valeo and 
Bosch). There are also some national capital groups that perform R&D themselves (e.g. Antolín Irausa, Ficosa 
International, Gestamp, CIE Automotive and Mondragón Automotive). 
The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, the second section provides a 
review of the literature on the theories that justify the firms’ choice of performing R&D 
cooperation activities and the role of firm size in such decisions. The third section describes 
the data and provides a descriptive analysis of this phenomenon, while section four presents 
the results of the regressions on the determinants of R&D cooperation agreements for the 
different types of partnership. The last section offers the main conclusions. 
  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In the literature there is no consensus regarding the effect of firm size on the probability of 
collaborating with external agents. Theoretically, according to Robertson and Gatignon 
(1998), to conduct R&D it is necessary to have sufficient amount of financial, technical and 
human resources, which is more often the case in large firms (Rothwell and Dogson 1991; 
Narula, 2004). In addition, to absorb the external knowledge offered by other agents, firms 
need to have an internal knowledge base and conduct internal R&D activities (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989; Veugelers and Cassiman, 2005), which tend to be higher in large firms 
(Tether, 2002). However, small firms are characterized by having lower economies of scale 
in R&D, reduced funding and scarce staff to carry out innovative activities as well as other 
innovation critical resources such as management skills to create and maintain innovation 
projects (Narula, 2004; Chun and Mun, 2012). Therefore, one could think that cooperation 
should enable them to overcome this reduced availability of funds (Hewitt-Dundas, 2006) 
and share with others the fixed costs associated with such projects (Busom and Fernández-
Ribas, 2008).  
 
According to Forrest and Martin (1992), when SMEs collaborate in R&D projects, they 
seek a quick scanning of new technologies, sharing the risks of developing new products 
and accessing new funding. In contrast, for large firms, the advantage of cooperation is to 
access the experience of the partner in R&D activities, have a window open to new 
technologies and develop products for specific market niches. It seems to follow, therefore, 
that although with different motivations, both large and small firms have incentives to 
embark on cooperation agreements for carrying out innovation activities. And from that 
point of view, firm size should not influence the propensity of firms to establish 
cooperation agreements in innovation. Is this conclusion corroborated at the empirical 
level? A large number of empirical studies conclude that large firms cooperate to a greater 
extent (e.g. Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Becker and Dietz, 2004; Miotti and Sachwald, 
2003; Negassi, 2004), benefit more from cooperation (Veugelers, 1998) and innovate more 
openly than SMEs (De Backer, 2008). A clear exception is the study of Abramovsky et al. 
(2009), which in the case of a sample of firms from four European countries did not found 
that the size effect was significant in explaining innovation cooperation. For the Spanish 
case it has also been found that there is a greater propensity to cooperate in the case of large 
firms (Bayona et al., 2001; López, 2008). In the Spanish automotive supplier industry, 
Martínez and Pérez (2002) verified the existence of a positive relationship between the size 
of the firm and cooperation with customers. Also, for the Catalan case and in relation to 
cooperation with the direct suppliers of OEMs, Llorente (2012) obtained that large firms 
cooperate in R&D at a higher rate than smaller ones. Therefore, although there are 
theoretical arguments that motivate both large and small firms to take partnerships in 
innovation activities with external agents, evidence seems to suggest that large firms tend to 
do it more frequently, although this relation can vary according to the type of partnership. 
 
When a firm in the automobile industry decides to cooperate to carry out R&D activities, it 
can be either with customers and suppliers (vertical cooperation), with firms of the same 
group, with universities and technology centers (institutional cooperation) or with 
competitors (horizontal cooperation). The motivation for choosing to cooperate in R&D 
may be different in each case and also in relation to the size of the firm. 
  
In the case of vertical cooperation, the customer knows what he wants and needs, giving 
information to their suppliers to ease product innovations (Tether, 2002). Their mutual 
collaboration helps to identify market opportunities for technological development, reduces 
the risk of uncertainty associated with market introduction of new products from new ideas 
from collaboration with clients, and facilitates identifying new market trends (Kuen-Hung, 
2009; Von Hippel et al., 1999). Cooperation with suppliers in new product development 
often allows improvements in the quality and cost reduction of products through process 
innovation (Hagedorrn, 1993) and reduces project development lead times (Clark 1989). In 
the automotive industry outsourced components can be classified as supplier proprietary 
parts, detail-controlled parts, or black-box part (Clark, 1989, Mikkola, 2003, Koufteros et 
al., 2007). The automakers have outsourced most of the R&D and production activities 
formerly done in-house to external suppliers (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Womack et al. 
(1990); Takeishi, 2001). The automakers accumulate global knowledge of the vehicle, 
while their suppliers have more technical knowledge about the components, systems and 
modules, so that manufacturers delegated more R&D to them. 
  
The adjusted production model incorporates a close relationship between the manufacturer 
and part of its suppliers, which is a long term and based on (Womack et al., op. cit.; Sako 
and Helper, 1998). The first-tier suppliers cooperate with the OEMs in the dessign 
(Volpato, 2004) and co-development of new product development process (Liker et al., 
1996). Even some suppliers involve themselves in the early phase of development of new 
concepts (Langner and Seidel, 2009; Kamat and Liker, 1994), although some automakers 
use the strategic segmentation across suppliers (Dyer et al., 1998). In any case, only a part 
of the suppliers maintain relationship with the automakers, whereas others keep competitive 
relationships (Helper and Sako, 1998). The trend in this century is to converge towards a 
hybrid “close but adversarial” model (Ro et al., 2008), from the models “Exit” and “Voice” 
to Hybrid Collaborative (MacDuffie and Helper, 2007).  
 
The first-level suppliers tend to be large multinationals that are very often strategic partners 
of the assemblers; while when descending in the pyramid of suppliers, business size 
decreases and firms tend to carry out less R&D activities, since they have fewer resources 
to do them (human, technological and financial resources). They usually provide products 
with lower technological content which, as a consequence, reduce the interdependence 
between customers and suppliers giving place to more competitive relationships 
(Mahapatra et al., 2010). 
 
In the case of the automotive industry, cooperation with firms within the group arises in 
some cases as a result of the fact that subsidiaries of foreign multinationals often have 
relevant technical centers located in the matrix or in subsidiaries in other countries where 
manufacturers have relevant technological centers (Llorente, 2011). In these cases, a 
competitive advantage of the group is the successful transfer of tacit knowledge from 
headquarters to subsidiaries (Rugraff, 2011).  
 
With respect to institutional cooperation, universities and R&D centers are the main public 
research infrastructure which is incorporated in the system of innovation (Nelson, 1993), 
and one of the most important sources of technological spillovers (Benavides and Quintana, 
2000).3 On the one hand, universities and firms have increasingly been encouraged to 
collaborate in R&D activities on the basis of the triple-helix model (Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff, 2000). The need for basic research requires cooperation with public science 
institutions (Tether, 2002; Van Beers et al., 2008), and it has been said that the automotive 
firms depend on universities and public laboratories to undertake curiosity-driven basic 
research (Rutherford and Holmes, 2008). Universities provide access to new knowledge 
and research that enable the development of novel products (Hagerdoorn et al., 2000; Lee, 
2000). Along with R&D centers, they bring new ideas and complex innovations (Fontana et 
al., 2006), creating new scientific and technological knowledge (Lundvall, 1992), which 
complement the applied research made by the firm (Chastenet et al., 1990). In recent years 
has increased demand at university for applied research (Miller et al., 2014). The 
collaboration with universities increases the probability of the introduction of innovations 
that are new to the market (Mojón and Waelbroeck, 2003) and are very useful in the 
development of high tech technologies and research located at the technological frontier 
(Van Looy et al., 2003; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003)4. Universities prefer to work with large 
firms, as they have higher financial resources for R&D and higher technological 
capabilities, giving them more prestige and greater opportunities for new research 
initiatives (Shapira et al., 1995; Beise and Stahl, 1999). On the other hand, technological 
centres focus their activity towards the generation, transfer and diffusion of technological 
                                                 
3 In Spain, it encompasses Public Innovation Organizations (OPIs) along with universities, which are the core of the 
Spanish public research system, running most of the activities planned in the National Plan for Scientific Research, 
Development and Technological Innovation. At the Spanish level, the Scientific Research Center (CSIC), Centre for 
Energy, Environment and Technology (CIEMAT) and the National Institute for Aerospace Technology (INTA) work with 
the automotive industry. 
4 In the automotive industry, nanotechnology offers new technological possibilities, with a substantial supply of it in 
certain Spanish universities (e.g. the University of Barcelona and the Polytechnic University of Catalonia) and in the 
CSIC. 
innovation in firms. Among their activities, we find the generation of R&D projects, 
consulting and technical assistance, technology diffusion and promotion of international 
cooperation. According to Santamaría (2001) and Bayona et al. (2002), technological 
centres seek knowledge which is more related to solve design problems and develop new 
products, whereas Gracia and Segura (2003) consider that they allow focusing the basic 
research carried out in universities and other research centres towards the improvement of 
businesses.5 Globally, universities and technology centres also allow firms to access 
specialized equipment and infrastructure (Callejón et al., 2008), to make tests and trials, 
offering highly qualified researchers (Dooley and Kirk, 2007).  
 
It is interesting to note that when taking into account institutional cooperation, the role of 
the firm’s size turns out to be different if we refer to universities or to technological centres. 
Barge-Gil et al. (2011) show that firms that collaborate with technological centres tend to 
be smaller, probably due to its lower internal capacity for innovation as well as the main 
orientation towards technological development, and not basic research, of technological 
centres. By contrast, large firms tend to collaborate more frequently with universities, 
thanks to their greater internal capabilities and the fact of being more oriented towards the 
basic research carried out in universities. The same is observed in Japan, with large firms 
collaborating more with universities than small firms (Motohashi, 2004). Rasiah and 
Govindaraju (2009) verified the importance of university as a source of knowledge in the 
automotive industry of Malaysia. Size was inversely correlated with university-industry 
collaboration alliances. Closer examination showed higher university-industry collaboration 
means among medium size firms. 
 
Horizontal cooperation is based on maintained cooperative relations between a firm and its 
competitors. The strategy of combining competition and cooperation deliberately with 
certain competitors is called coopetition (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996) and the 
objective is to obtain a game of positive sum and a better outcome both individually and 
                                                 
5 In the Spanish case, in 2006 the CENIT projects were introduced to encourage public-private partnerships in 
industrial research, establishing technological alliances between companies located in Spain and Spanish 
universities and technological centers. 
 
collectively (Bengtsson and Kock, 1999; Czakon, 2010). Firms can use collaboration with 
competitors to develop new technology for prospective markets and the need of to share 
risk (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003). However, coopetition can also be considered a risk 
because some competitors may have greater capacity to absorb external knowledge and 
thus access relevant information that can be used to their advantage in future research made 
individually. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) show, for the case of Belgian firms, that 
cooperation with competitors is used scarcely, probably because it is more difficult to 
manage and also for the risk it entails (Röller et al., 2007). Nieto and Santamaría (2007) 
verified, in the case of Spanish firms that collaborating with suppliers, customers and 
research centres has a positive impact on innovation novelty, while the effect is negative 
when collaborating with competitors.  
 
 
3. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
 
The database used is the Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC)6, from which we selected 
the firms available for the automotive industry, which results in a sample of 196 firms. Next, 
we try to describe the cooperation activities carried out in the Spanish automotive industry 
paying special attention to the type of agents cooperating as well as to the firm’s size.  
  
To characterize the sample across firms’ size and the type of capital, Table 1 shows that most 
firms have only domestic capital (64.8%) and are mainly SMEs (63.8% have less than 250 
employees). Specifically, nearly one third (30.1%) are small firms (<100 employees) with 
only national capital. In contrast, large firms (> 500 employees) are characterized by having 
clear superior foreign capital participation, with 16.3% of firms in the automotive industry 
being large and 12% out of the total are big and of foreign capital. 
  
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
                                                 
6 PITEC is a panel developed jointly by the Institute of National Statistics of Spain (INE), the Spanish Foundation for 
Science and Technology (FECYT) and the Cotec Foundation. 
In relation to the innovative activity carried out by Spanish automotive firms, figures in 
Table 2 offer the distribution of the internal R&D staff as a proxy of the innovation made 
by the firm. This gives a median of only 4 people devoted to research activities, with 25% 
of firms with at least 12 people and only 10% with more than 40 people. Indeed, these 
figures suggest, by and large, the existence of a very limited staff on innovation activities, 
with large firms (over 500 employees) having the best figures in this respect: a median of 
36 persons, with around 10% of these firms having over 200 employees dedicated to 
innovation. 
  
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
Since firm size is a key aspect in this research, Table 3 summarizes the output of the 
innovation made by Spanish automotive firms according to their size. From this table we 
draw the following insights. Most large firms present product (93.7%) and process 
innovations (84.3%) as well as both simultaneously (81.2%). This is in considerable 
contrast to small firms, which innovate much less frequently (71.6, 72.1 and 50.7%, 
respectively). Testing the hypothesis of independence between the type of technological 
innovation and the firm’s size (segmented into four categories), independence is rejected 
for all items except in the case of innovations on activities for supporting processes, where 
the differences in percentual points for the several sizes are very small. At the other 
extreme, in the case of innovations in manufacturing methods, the proportion is more than 
25 points higher in large firms, probably as a consequence of seeking improvements in their 
processes to reduce costs, improve quality and increase flexibility. Even more, the 
proportion of firms that perform logistics innovation increases directly with firm size in 
spectacular proportions (7.5% of small firms versus 50% of large). A potential explanation 
is that large suppliers often have to supply OEMs through arranged in sequences, with daily 
deliveries, so that manufacturers search for logistics integration with module suppliers, 
sharing the technological systems that allow for this (Bennet and Klug, 2012). Furthermore, 
in this group of large firms, full service suppliers who design their supply chain have 
increased in number. Instead, small firms in auxiliary industries use JIT less frequently and 
assume more costs of inventory of their parts.  
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
  
Focusing on innovation cooperation activities (Table 4), firms with more than 250 
employees collaborate to a greater extent than small firms. This is probably a result of the 
latter having less technologically complex products and that some small firms work 
according to design specifications, being the manufacturer or the supplier of a higher level 
the one that designs the product that must be manufactured and delivered afterwards. In 
addition and regardless of the size, the most common partner in the Spanish automotive 
industry are suppliers, being competitors the least frequent. This is hardly surprising given 
that collaborating with competitors seems to be considered by firms in the automotive 
industry more of a risk than an opportunity. 
  
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
 
Collaboration agreements with universities, consultants, commercial laboratories, private 
institutes and technological centres are not numerous. They are mainly performed by 
medium and large enterprises, since they are those that perform more research and product 
development.7 Cooperation with technological centres is higher than with universities in all 
sizes, probably because technological centres focus more on applied research, more 
interesting for firms developing new products. 31.3% of firms with more than 500 workers 
collaborate with technological centres, followed by 28.8% of firms with at least 250 
workers. Indeed, there is a clear association between firm size and each type of partnership, 
rejecting the null hypothesis of independence in all cases. 
  
It is interesting to highlight that firms often make simultaneous cooperation agreements 
with different types of partners and that there are significant differences depending on the 
size of the firms. Among the various pairs of combinations of agents, we observe that 
                                                 
7 Note that universities and technological centres provide firms with technological personnel and resources which are not 
available internally. So, a priori, one would think that small firms are those that could take higher advantage, although the 
results say the opposite. In this regard, some universities, as it is the case of the University of Barcelona (Llorente, 2012) 
offer the possibility for SMEs to incorporate a graduate student during six months at a reduced cost, with the aim of 
driving innovation in the firm, helping to understand the available supply of technological innovations in universities and 
reaching further agreements of collaboration. 
collaborating with customers and suppliers, and if we add collaborating with firms within 
the group, are the most frequent agreements in the range of 251-500 workers (Table 5). 
Also, in the case of large firms, 31% made cooperation with suppliers and firms within the 
group, simultaneously. Small firms make less simultaneous cooperation agreements, due to 
their lower frequency to perform R&D in a collaborative manner; however, when they 
decide to cooperate, they do it with suppliers and customers. Again, this points to the fact 
that companies seem to find benefits in having different forms of cooperation agreements 
simultaneously.  
 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
  
4. DETERMINANTS OF PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS IN THE AUTOMOTIVE 
INDUSTRY 
 
4.1 Methodological issues 
We plan now to analyze whether the determinants of R&D cooperation are different 
according to the different types of partners. To do so we estimate a bivariate probit model 
with two binary equations, each one for the main types of cooperation: Vertical and 
Institutional. Vertical cooperation includes cooperation with suppliers and/or customers 
whilst institutional cooperation includes cooperation with consultants, commercial labs or 
private R&D institutes, universities or other higher education institutions, public research 
organizations and technology centres. Cooperation with competitors is excluded from the 
analysis because very few automotive firms carry out this type of cooperation agreements 
(only 11 firms, representing 5.6% of the total). We also exclude cooperation with firms 
within the same group because only firms belonging to a group can have such kind of 
alliances, while all other types of cooperation may be chosen by all firms.  
  
We have two latent variables *1iy , 
*
2iy  measuring the difference between the benefits and 
costs that firm i obtained by carrying out vertical and institutional cooperation, respectively. 
We assume that these differences depend linearly on a set of characteristics of the firms 
( x ), 
 
* '
ij ij j ijy x    ,             j = 1, 2             (1) 
  
where βj is a vector of parameters including the constant term and εij are error terms 
distributed as a bivariate normal, each with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix V, 
where V has values of one in the diagonal and correlations ρ ij = ρ ji (j = 1, 2) as elements 
outside the diagonal. 
  
Since the latent variables are not directly observable and only their signs can be accounted 
for, binary variables are defined that summarize such signs as the choice made by firms for 
a certain type of cooperation. Hence, the bivariate probit model specifies the binary 
variables as follows: 
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4.2 Determinants of cooperative R&D: Expected effect and definition of variables 
Among the main factors influencing the decision of firms to participate in cooperation 
R&D agreements, on the one hand, economic literature highlights knowledge spillovers and 
the firms’ absorptive capacity8, while on the other hand, focuses on the importance of the 
costs, risks and complementarities present in the innovation process.9 
  
On the side of knowledge spillovers it is argued that both incoming and outgoing spillovers 
operate as determinants of cooperation strategies in R&D. Incoming spillovers are external 
knowledge flows that a firm is able to capture and the information sources for them are 
usually situated in the public domain; whereas outgoing spillovers refer to the ability of the 
firm to control knowledge flowing across its borders. The idea is that in order to internalize 
the information flows that may occur in the processes of innovation and to manage more 
                                                 
8 Some of the main references in this approach are Katz (1986), D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. 
(1992). 
9 The main ideas of such theories can be found in Pisano (1990), Das and Teng (2000) and Hagedoorn et al. (2000). 
effectively these flows, firms decide to participate in cooperative agreements. To measure 
these factors, we followed Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) and defined incoming spillovers 
as the importance attributed by the firm to publicly available information for carrying out 
innovation activities (public information from conferences, trade fairs, exhibitions, 
scientific journals and trade/technical publications, professional and industry associations), 
and legal protection as a proxy of outgoing spillovers, which considers if the firm used at 
least one legal method for protecting innovations (patents, registered an industrial design, 
trademark or copyright).  
 
At the empirical level, papers obtain predominantly positive results of incoming spillovers 
as determinants of cooperation agreements (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Veugelers and 
Cassiman, 2005; Serrano-Bedia et al., 2010, Chun and Mun, 2012). This way, firms that 
place a higher value on incoming spillovers and externally generated knowledge in their 
innovative activity might have a greater scope for learning and gaining from knowledge 
exchange through cooperative agreements. In addition, when taking into account the type of 
partner, this relationship would be expected to be stronger in collaborations with research 
institutions and universities. As signaled by Abramovsky et al. (2009), it might be expected 
that firms which are able to get more benefits from external knowledge might be more 
likely to engage in cooperation agreements with the research base. Meanwhile, in the 
literature on outgoing spillovers, the effect of appropriability problems on firms’ 
probability to engage in R&D cooperation agreements is ambiguous. On the one hand, a 
better appropriability of the results of innovation through protection may have a positive 
effect on cooperation in R&D, as firms can control outgoing information flows and there 
are less incentives for others to become a free rider on other firms’ investments (Cassiman 
and Veugelers, 2002). However, excessive legal protection may hinder the internalization 
of the flows shared by the partners and may thus have a negative effect on R&D 
cooperation (Hernán et al., 2003; López, 2008). This result must be smoothed according to 
the partner, since Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) obtained that a better appropriability 
would increase the probability of cooperating with customers or suppliers whereas it is 
unrelated with research institutes. Among other reasons, it is sensible to think that the 
information which is commercially sensitive, result of more applied research projects, often 
leaks out to competitors through common suppliers or customers. Therefore, only those 
firms with enough protection of their information would be willing to engage in 
cooperation agreements at the vertical level. 
 
Incoming spillovers are measured by the importance that the firm attributed, on a four-point 
scale, to publicly available information for the innovation process of the firm. The 
information sources were conferences, trade fairs, exhibitions, scientific journals and 
trade/technical publications, professional and industry associations. To generate a firm-
specific measure of incoming spillovers, we aggregated these answers by summing the 
scores on each of these questions and then the variable was rescaled from 0 (unimportant) 
to 1 (crucial). Firms that rate generally available external information sources as more 
important inputs to their innovation process are expected to be more likely to be actively 
engaged in cooperative R&D agreements. With the same survey data, we also computed the 
variable proxying for legal protection, which considers whether the firm used at least one 
legal method for protecting inventions or innovations (patents, registered an industrial 
design, trademark or copyright), taking a value of 1 if used, and 0 otherwise. There is not a 
consensus on the impact of such variable on cooperation, as surveyed in section 2. 
Although we could have considered other proxies for these spillover variables, we have 
followed Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) who pointed that the advantage of the ones 
suggested here is that they are direct and firm-specific, allowing for heterogeneity among 
firms.   
 
The absorptive capacity of the firm is another determinant of cooperation alliances in R&D. 
According to Cohen and Levinthal (1989), certain absorptive capacity is necessary to 
assimilate and exploit knowledge from the environment, so that a firm with more 
absorptive capacity is able to access a greater amount of knowledge than another with less 
capacity. Consequently, the first firm may draw greater benefits from cooperative 
innovation agreements. The absorptive capacity, approximated in the literature either as the 
ratio of internal expenditure on R&D, the number of employees in R&D or permanent 
R&D, has been found in many studies as an important feature of the firms with greater 
probability of cooperation (Bayona et al., 2001; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; López, 2008; 
Arranz and Arroyabe, 2008). However, one could also think that a greater absorptive 
capacity allows the firm to easily access external knowledge as well as getting benefit from 
it for free, thus having a lower incentive to cooperate. These arguments would be equally 
valid for any type of partner. Miotti and Sachwald (2003), for example, find a positive and 
significant impact of absorptive capacity on the probability of agreements with research 
institutions and with suppliers and customers. In this paper, internal R&D intensity is 
captured through the ratio between the intramural R&D expenditure and turnover. 
  
On the other hand, according to the literature of strategic management, firms use research 
partnerships with the idea of accessing complementary knowledge, or in order to share risks 
or costs (Hagedoorn, 1993). However, existing empirical studies show mixed results 
regarding the effects of these factors on R&D cooperation. Sakakibara (1997) obtain that 
access to complementary knowledge is one of the motivations to cooperate in R&D, 
whereas Bayona et al. (2001) signal both risk- and cost-sharing factors are significant 
determinants of cooperation. In contrast, Miotti and Sachwald (2003) found that none of 
these factors influence the likelihood of cooperation. Distinguishing cooperative R&D by 
type of partner, Belderbos et al. (2004) find that the risks that firms experience as an 
obstacle to innovation positively affect the likelihood of cooperation with competitors and 
suppliers, while cost sharing is only relevant for the decision to cooperate with research 
institutions. It seems, therefore, that it is necessary to estimate one model for each type of 
partnership, since the sign and relevance of their impact can be different in each case. Risk- 
and cost-sharing are proxied through the rates that the firm attributed to the uncertain 
demand for innovative goods or services and the score of the importance of the lack of 
funds or the consideration of innovation costs too high, as factors hampering their 
innovation activities, respectively. 
 
We also included firm size (<50 employees, 50-249, 250-499 and >500) and public funding 
of innovation, taking the value 1 if the firm belongs to the corresponding size range and has 
received any kind of public funding (local, regional or national), respectively, and zero 
otherwise. Large firms are expected to be more likely to be actively engaged in R&D 
cooperation agreements (Bayona, et al., 2001; Fritsch and Lukas, 2001; Tether, 2002; 
Miotti and Sachwald, 2003). It is argued that firms need to have certain structure and 
resources to be able to face the commitment required in partnerships and to benefit from 
cooperation agreements, irrespectively of the type of partnership. This is more probably 
available in large firms than in small firms. In addition, firms obtaining public R&D 
subsidies may be more likely to establish cooperation agreements with another firm or with 
institutions given that this way they have the resources to do the research (Arranz and Fdez 
de Arroyabe, 2008; Busom, Fernández-Ribas, 2008; Abramovsky et al., 2009). There are 
also reasons to believe that public funding may have a greater impact on the likelihood to 
engage in university collaborations, since institutional incentives for university scientists to 
transfer knowledge and technology to firms might be weak. Table 6 summarizes the 
construction of the variables used in the regression analysis.  
 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
 
4.3 Main Results 
The results of the estimation of the binomial probit model are provided in Table 7. As 
shown in the bottom of the table, the assumption that ρ is zero is rejected, showing that the 
binomial probit is more suitable than the estimation of the equations separately, providing 
evidence that there are interdependences between the different cooperation strategies. The 
positive and significant estimated coefficient of correlation of the error terms (ρ) may be 
due to complementarities in R&D cooperation strategies but also to the existence of 
unobserved firm-specific factors affecting the decision regarding the different types of 
cooperation. 
  
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
 
With respect to the traditional determinants of cooperation, the estimates show a positive 
and significant relationship between in coming spillovers and the probability of cooperating 
in the two types of partnership. We obtain that if the firm gives more importance to 
information publicly available and useful for innovation processes, the firm tends to be 
more able to exploit spillovers in order to increase the productivity of its innovation 
activities and consequently obtain higher profits through cooperation agreements 
(Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; López, 2008). Comparing both types of partners, we 
obtain a greater impact of incoming spillovers in the case of cooperation with institutions. 
This result is in accordance with the theoretical argument given by Abramovsky et al. 
(2009) that firms which are able to get more benefits from external knowledge might be 
more likely to engage in cooperation agreements with the research base or, at least, with 
firms outside their own industry. This way, it seems fair to conclude that automotive firms 
benefit greatly from the information coming from external sources, especially when it 
comes through cooperation, and mainly through cooperation with university and research 
institutions. 
  
In line with some previous empirical studies, we also find that the ability to appropriate the 
results of innovation positively affects the likelihood of cooperation in R&D (López, 2008; 
Abramovsky et al., 2009). This variable proxies for the possibility of the firm of 
appropriating the results of the innovation, known in the literature as outgoing spillovers or 
outgoing information flows. Our results show that making use of protection methods of the 
benefits of innovations, i.e. reducing the transmission of unintended information flows, the 
probability to cooperate with suppliers or customers increases, but it does not affect the 
probability to cooperate with research institutions. This can be probably due to the 
ambiguity of the impact of appropriability. Despite the argument in favour of a positive 
impact of appropriability on cooperative agreements, excessive legal protection may also 
hinder the internalization of the flows shared by the partners and may thus have a negative 
effect on R&D cooperation (Hernán et al., 2003; López, 2008). Also, and taking into 
account the type of partner, it is sensible to think that the information which is 
commercially sensitive, result of applied research projects, often leaks out to competitors 
through common suppliers or customers. Therefore, only those firms with enough 
protection of their information would be willing to engage in cooperation agreements at the 
vertical level. In other words, we might expect firms facing appropriability problems be 
less likely to engage in collaborative arrangements with suppliers or customers compared to 
agreements with more dissimilar partners, for instance with research institutes, where free-
riding may be less feasible and the incentives to do it are lower given they are not 
competing in the same market.  
 
For the automobile firms in Spain, the effect of the intensity of R&D activities is not 
relevant in the decision to participate neither in vertical nor in institutional cooperative 
agreements. This could be a consequence of the existence of arguments in favour and 
against the positive impact of R&D intensity on cooperation. As pointed out in the previous 
section, a certain absorptive capacity is required to assimilate and exploit knowledge in the 
environment. However, a greater absorptive capacity allows the firm to easily access 
external knowledge as well as getting benefit from it for free, thus having a lower incentive 
to cooperate. Additionally, another possible explanation for this non-significant result 
might be that the magnitude of internal R&D expenditure over turnover is not very high in 
the Spanish automotive firms.  
 
We can also conclude that the problem associated to cost constraints to carry out innovation 
activities seems not to be relevant in the decision to participate in cooperation agreements 
(it is negative and marginally significant only in the case of vertical cooperation). 
Regarding the risk factor obstructing innovation activities, it appears that automobile firms 
that give greater value to risks as a factor hampering innovation are more likely to engage 
in cooperation agreements both with suppliers or customers and research institutions. Given 
their aversion to the risks inherent in innovation activities, by combining their efforts with 
research institutions or with customers and suppliers in a partnership agreement, firms can 
alleviate the barriers to innovation or at least share the risks inherent to innovation. 
  
The estimation results also show that public financial support from local and national 
government is one of the main determinants of R&D collaboration in both types of 
cooperation agreements. This result is consistent with most previous empirical literature 
(Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; Arranz and Arroyabe, 2008; Busom and Fernandez-Ribas, 
2008) who find that public subsidies for innovation have a particularly strong effect on 
increasing the partnerships with research institutions (universities, technological centres 
and/or public research organizations). This can be partly explained by the fact that often 
subsidies are designed to stimulate the relationship between enterprises and universities, 
which is corroborated by the larger magnitude of the coefficient in the case of institutional 
cooperation than in the vertical, although also significant in the latter.  
  
The size of firms has a positive and significant effect on the probability of carrying out 
cooperation agreements in both types of partnerships. Thus, in the case of vertical 
cooperation, firms with more than 500 workers are most likely to make cooperative 
agreements in R&D. While in the case of institutional cooperation, firms with more than 
250 employees are the ones having a higher probability of cooperating, other things equal. 
This higher propensity to cooperate of large firms can be explained by the fact that they are 
more able to face the commitment required in partnerships and to better reap the returns of 
cooperation agreements, thanks to the availability of a greater structure and greater 
resources. Despite small firms may need cooperation with other firms or institutions in 
order to manage innovation activities which otherwise could not carry out because of their 
limited resources, it seems that the evidence provided in our study also gives more support 
to the former theoretical argument, being big firms more likely to enter in R&D 
cooperation agreements, irrespectively of the type of partner.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
In this study we examined cooperation in R&D in the automotive sector in Spain. Spanish 
firms in this sector are mainly characterized by innovating in products and processes, but 
generally have a small number of staff assigned to R&D, except large firms with over 500 
workers, which perform more innovation in products. In contrast, small firms are less 
innovative, partly because this group is characterized by a higher proportion of firms 
receiving, already designed and developed by the customer, the product to be 
manufactured. In the case of process innovations, firms with more than 500 workers are 
also distinguished by developing more logistic innovations, due to the importance of 
logistics for their competitiveness and for the EOMs requirement to have an adequate 
integration, to make the JIT supply arrange in sequences efficiently. 
  
Specifically, first, we analyze to what extent firms in the sector cooperate with various 
external actors in the field of technological innovation, and if so, with what type of 
cooperation partner, paying special attention to the role the size of the firms may play in 
this type of activities. In particular, we see that suppliers and firms in the group are the 
external agents with whom automotive firms cooperate the most. Instead, competitors are 
the least frequent, that is, the coopetition strategy is poorly implemented in the Spanish 
automobile case. The low collaboration with universities and research centers can be a 
result of the little awareness of SMEs about the real possibilities offered by the research 
groups at the universities. This can also be a consequence of the fact that most foreign 
capital multinationals that innovate in product in Spain, only carry out the product 
development phase in its Spanish subsidiaries, and make significantly less research and 
design of their products.  
 
Small firms cooperate less frequently than big firms, despite having fewer resources to 
conduct R&D, which one would think as an incentive in favour of cooperation. On the 
contrary, we observe that large firms are those that offer higher rates of institutional 
cooperation. Simultaneous cooperation with different agents is very low in medium and 
large firms, being null in small firms. 
  
In relation to the factors that have a determining effect on the decision of firms to carry out 
collaborative activities in R&D, we estimated a bivariate probit model that takes into 
account the two most common types of cooperation in the automotive industry, vertical and 
institutional cooperation, explicitly considering the interdependencies that may arise in the 
simultaneous choice of both. We obtain that when firms give more importance to 
information publicly available and useful for innovation processes, it is because they are 
better able to exploit spillovers in order to increase the productivity of their innovation 
activities and consequently obtain higher benefits through cooperation agreements, so that 
they do cooperate, being this determinant more clear in institutional cooperation 
agreements. Also, it seems that using legal protection methods and having public financial 
support from local and national government are important determinants of collaboration 
agreements, especially for the case of customers and suppliers. By contrast, in the case of 
automobile firms in Spain, the effect of the intensity of R&D activities is not relevant in the 
firms’ decision to participate in vertical or institutional cooperation agreements, nor is the 
existence of cost constraints to carry out innovation activities. Instead, we observe that the 
automotive firms that give greater value to the risk factor as hampering innovation 
activities are more likely to engage in cooperation agreements with suppliers or customers 
and research institutions. 
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Table 1. Number of firms by size and type of capital 
 Public Private without foreign capital 
Private with 
participation of 
foreign capital 
< 10% 
Private with 
participation of 
foreign capital 
10% - 50% 
Private with 
participation of 
foreign capital 
> 50% 
Total 
< 100 0 (0.0%) 59 (30.1%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.5%) 7 (3.6%)  67 (34.2%) 
101-250 0 (0.0%) 37 (18.9%) 2 (1.0%) 1 (0.5%) 18 (8.7%) 58 (29.6%) 
251-500 2 (1.0%) 20 (10.2%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (1.5%) 14 (7.1%) 39 (19.9%) 
> 500 0 (0.0%) 9 (4.6%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.5%) 22 (11.2%) 32 (16.3%) 
Total 2 (1.0%) 125 (63.8%)  2 (1.0%) 6 (3.1%) 61 (31.1%) 196 (100.0%) 
Source: PITEC and own calculations 
Note: Percentages are calculated over the number of total firms. 
  
Table 2. Internal staff dedicated to R&D 
 N Mean Var. Coef. First quartile Median Third quartile Ninth decile 
Total firms  196 15.8 229.1% 0 4 12 40.0 
  < 50 employees 42 3.1 93.3% 0 3 5 7.7 
  50-100 employees 25 5.0 154.6% 0 3 7.5 13.8 
  < 100 employees 67 3.8 134.0% 0 3 5 9.2 
  101-250 employees 58 5.5 125.1% 0 3 9 14.8 
  251-500 employees 39 12.0 130.3% 0 8 17 47 
  > 500 employees 32 64 108.9% 9.2 36.5 91.2 207 
With innovation in products 151 19.7 210.0% 0 6 15.5 48.4 
With internal expenditure on R&D 134 23.1 181.2% 3.7 8.5 20.2 56.5 
Source: PITEC and own calculations 
   
Table 3. Type of technological innovation by firm size. Relative frequencies. Association 
between type of technological innovation and firm size.  
  < 100 101-250 251-500 > 500 Chi-squared p-value V Cramer 
Product Innovation 71.6% 74.1% 76.9% 93.7% 6.432 0.092 (†) 0.181 
Process Innovation 71.6% 77.6% 82.1% 84.4% 2.654 0.448 0.116 
   Innov. in manufacturing methods 55.2% 65.5% 69.2% 81.2% 6.863 0.076 (†) 0.187 
   Innov. in logistics systems 7.5% 15.5 33.3% 50.0% 27.265 0.000 (**) 0.373 
   Innov. of support in processes 37.3% 37.9% 35.9% 46.9% 1.098 0.778 0.075 
Product & process Innov.  50.7% 62.1% 71.1% 81.2% 9.975 0.019 (*) 0.226 
# firms 67 (100%) 58 (100%) 39 (100%) 32 (100%)       
Source: PITEC and own calculations. 
Note: Percentages are calculated with respect to the size group. (†) p <0.1, (*) p <0.05, (**) p <0.01 
  
Table 4. Partners of R&D cooperation activities by firm size. Relative frequencies. Association 
between type of partner and firm size.  
  < 100 101-250 251-500 > 500 Total Chi-squared p-value Phi 
Customers 3 (4.5%) 9 (15.5%) 12 (30.8%) 5 (15.6%) 29 (14.8%) 13.593 0.004 0.263 (**) 
Suppliers 13 (19.4%) 19 (32.8%) 13 (33.3%) 13 (40.6%) 58 (29.6%) 5.749 0.,124 0.171 
Firms in the group 5 (7.5%) 18 (31.0%) 12 (30.8%) 13 (40.6%) 48 (24.5%) 17.184 0.001 0.296 (**) 
Universities  3 (4.5%) 11 (19.0%) 9 (23.1%) 7 (21.9%) 30 (15.3%) 9.541 0.023 0.221 (*) 
OPIs 1 (1.5%) 5 (8.6%) 4 (10.3%) 6 (18.8%) 16 (8.2%) 9.005 0.029 0.214 (*) 
Technological centers 5 (7.5%) 12 (20.7%)  11 (28.2%) 10 (31.3%) 38 (19.4%) 10.98 0.012 0.237 (*) 
Consulting, laboratories and private 
institutions 
3 (4.4%) 8 (14.0%) 8 (20.5%)  6 (18.8%) 25 (12.8%) 7.324 0.062 0.193 
Competitors 2 (2.9%) 4 (6.9%) 3 (7.7%) 1 (3.1%) 10 (5.1%) 0.1805 0.614 0.096 
Size of each sub-sample or sample 67 (100%) 58 (100%)  39 (100%) 32 (100%) 196       
Source: PITEC and own calculations.  
Note: Percentages are calculated with respect to the size of all the firms (in the sample, cooperative and non-cooperative firms included).  
(†) p <0.1, (*) p <0.05, (**) p <0.01 
   
 
Table 5. Partners of R&D cooperation activities by firm size. Joint frequencies.  
 < 100 101-250 251-500 > 500 Total 
Customers + Suppliers 3 (4,5%) 7 (12,1%) 10 (25,6%) 4 (12,5%) 24 (12,2%) 
Customers + Firms in the group 1(1,5%) 8 (13,8%) 9 (23,1%) 3 (9,4%) 21(10,7%) 
Suppliers + Firms in the group 3 (4,5%) 11 (19,0%) 7 (17,9%) 10 (31,2%) 31 (15,8%) 
Customers + Suppliers + Firms in the group 1 (1,5%) 6 (10,3%) 7 (17,9%) 3 (9,4%) 17 (15,8%) 
Customers + Suppliers + Consulting, lab and private institutions 1 (1,4%) 4 (6,9%) 6 (15,4%) 3 (9,4%) 14 (7,1%) 
Customers + Suppliers+ Firms in the group + Consulting, lab and private inst 1 (1,4%) 4 (8,8%) 4 (10,3%) 3 (9,4%) 12 (6,1%) 
Customers + Suppliers + Competitors 0 (0,0%) 3 (5,2%) 3 (7,7%) 1 (3,1%) 7 (3,6%) 
Customers + Suppliers + Firms in the group + Competitors 0 (0,0%) 2 (3,5%) 3 (7,7%) 1 (3,1%) 6 (3,1%) 
Customers + Suppliers + Group + Consulting, lab and private inst + Competitors 0 (0,0%) 2 (3,5%) 2 (5,1%) 1 (3,1%) 5 (2,6%) 
Universities + Technological centres 1 (1,4%) 7 (12,1%) 6 (15,4%) 5 (15,5%) 18 (9,2%) 
Universities + OPIs 0 (0,0%) 4 (6,9%) 4 (10,3%) 5 (15,5%) 13 (6,6%) 
Universities + OPIs + Technological centres 0  (0,0%) 3 (5,1%) 3  (7,7%) 5  (15,6%) 11 (5,6%) 
Universities + Technological centres + Consulting, lab and private inst 0 (0,0%) 5 (8,6%) 4 (10,3%) 4 (12,5%) 13 (6,6%) 
Universities + OPIs + Technological centres + Consulting, lab and private inst 0 (0,0%) 2 (3,5%) 2 (5,1%) 4 (12,5%) 8 (4,1%) 
Suppliers + Universities 1 (1,5%) 8 (13,9%) 9 (23,1%) 6 (18,7%) 24 (12,2%) 
Suppliers + Technological centres 2 (3,0%) 10 (17,2%) 9 (23,1%) 7 (21,9%) 28 (14,3%) 
Customers + Universities 1 (1,5%) 6 (10,3%) 8 (20,5%) 2 (6,2%) 17 (8,7%) 
Customers + Technological centres 0 (0,0%) 7 (12,1%) 9 (23,1%) 3 (9,4%) 19 (9,7%) 
Suppliers + Universities + Technological centres 0 (0,0%) 7 (12,1%) 6 (15,4%) 4 (12,5%) 17 (8,7%) 
Suppliers + Firms in the group + Universities + Technological centres 0 (0,0%) 6 (10,3%) 5 (12,6%) 4 (12,5%) 15 (7,6%) 
Customers + Universities + Technological centres 0 (10,3%) 6 (10,3%) 6 (15,4%) 2 (6,3%) 14 (7,1%) 
Customers + Suppliers + Universities + Technological centres 0 (0,0%) 6 (10,3%) 6 (15,4%) 2 (6,2%) 14 (7,1%) 
Customers + Suppliers + Universities  + OPIs + Technological centres 0 (0,40%) 3  (5,1%) 3 (7,7%) 2  (6,2%) 8 (4,1%) 
Customers + Suppliers + Universities + OPIs + Technological centres + Consulting, lab 
and private inst 0 (0,0%) 2  (3,5%) 2 (5,1%) 2 (6,2%) 6 (3,1%) 
Customers + Suppliers + Firms in the group + Universities + OPIs + Technological 
centres + Consulting, lab and private inst + Competitors 0 (0,0%) 2 (3,5%) 1 (2,6%) 1 (3,1(%) 4 (2,0%) 
Sample 67 (100%) 58  (100%) 39  (100%) 32  (100%) 196 (100%) 
Source: PITEC and own calculations. 
Note: Percentages are calculated with respect to the size of all the firms (in the sample, cooperative and non-cooperative firms included).  
 
   
Table 6. Definition of the variables included in the regression analysis 
Variables Definitions
Dependent 
Cooperation with 
Suppliers or Customers 
(Vertical) 
= 1 if the firm cooperated in some of their innovation activities with suppliers of equipment, materials, 
components or software, or customers in the period 2006-2008
= 0 otherwise 
Cooperation with Research 
Institutions (Institutional) 
= 1 if the firm cooperated in some of their innovation activities with consultants, commercial labs or private 
institutes R&D, Universities or other higher education institutions, government or public research organizations 
(OPIs), and technology centres in the period 2006-2008
= 0 otherwise 
Independent 
Incoming Spillovers 
= 1 - sum of the score of importance that the firm attributed [number between 1 (high) and 4 (Not relevant / not 
employed)] to the source of information from conferences, trade fairs, exhibitions, scientific journals and 
trade/technical publications, professional and industry associations. Rescaled between 0 (unimportant) and 1 
(crucial)
Legal Protection of 
Innovation 
= 1 if the firm applied for a patent, registered an industrial design, registered a trademark, and / or claimed 
copyright
= 0 otherwise 
Internal R&D Intensity Ratio between internal R&D expenditure and turnover of the firm
Risks 
= 1 - the score of importance that the firm attributed [number between 1 (high) and 4 (Not relevant / not 
employed)] to the uncertain demand for innovative goods or services as a factor hampering their innovation 
activities. Rescaled between 0 (unimportant) and 1 (crucial) 
Costs 
= 1 - sum of the score of importance that the firm attributed [number between 1 (high) and 4 (Not relevant / not 
employed)] to the lack of funds within the group of firms, lack of funding from sources outside the firm, 
innovation cost too high as factors hampering their innovation activities. Rescaled between 0 (unimportant) and 1 
(crucial)
Public Funding of 
Innovation 
= 1 if the firm received public financial support from local or regional government and / or central government for 
their innovation activities 
= 0 otherwise 
Firm Size 
<50 employees = 1 if the firm has less than 50 employees, = 0 otherwise
50-249 employees = 1 if the firm has between 50 and 249 employees, = 0 otherwise 
250-499 employees = 1 if the firm has between 250 and 499 employees, = 0 otherwise 
500 or more employees = 1 if the firm has 500 or more employees, = 0 otherwise 
Note: All explanatory variables come from PITEC 2006. 
 
  
     Table 7. Binomial probit model of R&D cooperation in the automotive sector 
  Vertical Cooperation Institutional Cooperation 
Incoming Spillovers 0.7535 * 1.0839 ** 
  (0.395) (0.435) 
Legal Protection 0.5828 ** 0.0557 
  (0.246) (0.245) 
Internal R&D Intensity -1.5508 -0.643 
  (1.813) (1.647) 
Risks 0.9936 *** 0.9228 ** 
  (0.345) (0.38) 
Costs -0.6939 * -0.3781 
  (0.412) (0.438) 
Public funding 0.6793 *** 1.1492 *** 
  (0.216) (0.234) 
Firm Size (base <50 employees)     
50 - 249 employees 0.3423 0.4042 
  0.287 (0.326) 
250 - 499 employees 0.5176 0.7449 ** 
  (0.316) (0.351) 
500 or more employees 0.6754 ** 0.711 * 
  (0.343) (0.378) 
Constant -1.699 *** -2.3764 *** 
  (0.375) (0.424) 
Ρ 0.7610 *** 
  (0.075) 
N 190  
LogL -168.466  
Wald Test Chi2(18) = 66.72 
Ho: the coefficients are jointly = 0 Prob>chi2 = 0.000 
Heteroskedasticity-Robust Standard Errors. (*) p <0.1, (**) p <0.05, (***) p <0.01. 
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